This study extended previous research on the impact of personal and social comparison information about health risk by asking respondents what other information they require. A total of 197 students responded to 1 of 12 vignettes describing hypothetical risks of developing pancreatic disease. These vignettes varied in terms of personal risk, comparison group risk and disease severity. Higher threat manipulations elicited higher ratings of negative affect, although perceived ambiguity moderated this effect. When information was more threatening, respondents requested more information, especially about controlling the disease threat. These results indicate the importance of providing unambiguous information, information about how to control a threat and information people want.
Introduction
I N R E C E N T years, research into when and how people compare themselves to others has flourished, using increasingly diverse methods and contexts (Buunk & Gibbons, 1997; Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler, 2003; Suls & Wheeler, 2000) . One such area involves examining the extent to which people use information about personal risk of threats to health, or information about how their risk compares to the risk of other people.
These issues were examined in a series of studies by Klein (1997) , where the levels of personal and social comparison information given to respondents were experimentally manipulated. Klein found that the social comparison information manipulation had a greater impact on cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes, than did the personal information manipulation, and in some cases the personal information manipulations had no significant effect. For example, in one of these studies, respondents were asked to imagine that they had undergone a test for a genetic marker of pancreatic disease. Those respondents who were asked to imagine being told that their personal risk was 30 per cent compared with an average risk of 10 per cent were more disturbed than those respondents who were asked to imagine their personal risk was 60 per cent compared with an average risk of 80 per cent.
Attempts at replicating Klein's (1997) original studies have, however, yielded virtually every possible pattern of results. One exact replication of the pancreatic disease study found no main effects, but a significant interaction, of the form that the impact of comparison information was larger for 30 per cent personal risk than for 60 per cent personal risk (Harris, Sparks, & Raats, 2002, Study 1) . Another found main effects of equal size for both personal and comparison risk manipulations (French, Sutton, Marteau, & Kinmonth, 2004) . Other replications, with a similar experimental design, but different vignette content, have found main effects of personal risk only (Harris et al., 2002, Study 2a) , main effects of both manipulations, with the personal risk manipulation having a larger effect (French et al., 2004) and completely null effects (Harris et al., 2002, Study 2b) . In a further series of studies, Klein (2003) again found stronger effects of comparison risk information than personal risk information.
These conflicting findings suggest that a number of factors affect whether personal risk or comparison risk information is more important in determining the impact of risk communications. The present study aims to extend this previous research in a number of ways, in an attempt to shed more light on these differing results.
One potential problem with the research in this area to date is that, as Harris and colleagues (2002) have noted, people tend to believe that more prevalent conditions are less serious (Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986) . Thus, those respondents in the experimental conditions receiving high levels of comparison risk information may also believe that the relevant condition (e.g. pancreatic disease) is less severe than those respondents who receive lower levels of comparison risk information: comparison risk and severity are confounded. To address this problem, the present study manipulates severity independently of personal and comparison information, thereby manipulating both dimensions of threat: likelihood and severity (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) .
A further area where it may be possible to improve upon previous research in this area is in the experimental design of the studies. In many of the studies to date, levels of comparison risk have been ± 20 per cent of the personal levels (French et al., 2004; Harris et al., 2002; Klein, 1997 Klein, , 2003 . Thus, the levels of personal and comparison risk have been as follows: 30 per cent and 10 per cent, 30 per cent and 50 per cent, 60 per cent and 40 per cent, 60 per cent and 80 per cent. This strategy has resulted in the levels of personal and comparison risk being correlated: the levels of comparison risk are higher when personal risk is 60 per cent than when personal risk is 30 per cent. This has the potential to cause problems in statistical analysis and interpretation due to collinearity. For example, the interaction found by Harris and colleagues (2002) , where the impact of comparison information was larger for 30 per cent personal risk than for 60 per cent personal risk could be a genuine effect, whereby at lower levels of personal risk, comparison risk has more impact on the extent to which people are disturbed. Alternatively, it could be that at 30 per cent personal risk, the comparison risk levels of 10 per cent and 50 per cent have a larger relative difference to the personal risk than the comparison risk levels of 40 per cent and 80 per cent have to the 60 per cent level of personal risk. The present study instead uses personal and comparison risk levels that are genuinely orthogonal: 10 per cent and 30 per cent personal risk, and 5 per cent, 20 per cent and 35 per cent comparison risk.
The present study also examines the role of perceived ambiguity of information in moderating the impact of personal and comparison risk information. Klein argues that his findings (1997, 2003) , where comparison risk has more impact than personal risk, run counter to Festinger's (1954) theorizing on the subject. Festinger stated that 'when an objective, nonsocial basis for the evaluation of one's ability or opinion is readily available persons will not evaluate their opinions or abilities by comparison with others ' (1954, p. 120 ). Klein's arguments are correct, only if one accepts that absolute probability estimates of personal risk are 'objective'. As both French and colleagues (2004) and Harris and colleagues (2002) argue, although the absolute personal risk information may be 'objective', it may still be ambiguous or unclear. Thus, the following reformulation may better capture the spirit of Festinger's (1954) theorizing: when personal information is unambiguous and clear, rather than necessarily 'objective', people will not use information about how others compare with them. The argument that absolute probability estimates may still be ambiguous is supported by the finding that the more confident respondents felt that they understood the information provided, the stronger was the influence of both personal and comparison risk manipulations on ratings of worry or being disturbed (French et al., 2004) . Thus, an assessment should be made of how clear, unambiguous and sufficient respondents find the information with which they have been provided.
The final area where the present study extends previous work is in the nature of the task respondents are asked to do. In the studies in this area to date, respondents have been provided with risk information, and asked to respond to it. This reaction approach to studying social comparison processes can be distinguished from narration approaches, which investigate respondents' reports of everyday social comparisons, and selection approaches, which study the processes involved when respondents seek social information (Wood, 1996) . Most selection approaches involve assessing the target with which individuals people choose to compare themselves (e.g. Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999) . The present study employs a different kind of selection approach, by asking respondents what additional information they would like if they were in the scenario provided. By combining more than one approach to studying social comparison processes, we can have more faith in results that converge across approaches.
The present study therefore investigates the effect of personal and social comparison risk information, as well as severity information, with levels of each orthogonal to each other, using a slightly modified version of the pancreatic disease vignette study. As dependent variables, in addition to ratings of affect and likelihood, the present study includes ratings of the ambiguity, clarity and completeness of the information provided. Finally, as an extension to previous studies in this area, the present study includes respondents' open-ended responses to the question about what additional information they would like.
Methods

Design
Participants responded to 1 of 12 vignettes, which differed according to a 2 (personal risk: 10% or 30%) ϫ 3 (comparison risk: 5%, 20% or 35%) ϫ 2 (severity: high or low) betweensubjects design.
Participants
The sample consisted of 197 undergraduate students attending psychology classes at Trinity College, Dublin. They participated in groups of 10-60 people, in return for course credit.
Materials
All respondents received a brief questionnaire with a vignette on the front cover, as follows:
We would like you to VIVIDLY IMAGINE that you are at a consultation with your GP.
After you have sat down in the office, the GP asks you questions about yourself and about your health in general. You are then asked about your lifestyle habits such as your exercise, eating, drinking and smoking behaviour. In addition to asking you these questions, the GP performs a number of tests on you and a sample of your blood is taken and tested. On the basis of your answers to the questions and these tests, your GP tells you that your risk of developing pancreatic disease is x per cent in the next 10 years.
On average, other people the same age and sex as you stand a y per cent chance of developing pancreatic disease in the next 10 years.
The final paragraph of the vignettes differed according to whether respondents were in the high or low severity condition.
High severity
Your GP then tells you that pancreatic disease occurs when digestive enzymes attack and destroy the pancreas and nearby tissues, causing scarring and pain. The pain is typically severe in the stomach and may reach to the back and other areas. In addition, pancreatic disease may cause the heart, lungs, or kidneys to fail and ultimately cause premature death.
Low severity
Your GP then tells you that pancreatic disease is caused by a slight imbalance of digestive enzymes in the pancreas. The disease is generally symptom-free with infrequent episodes of mild pain reported by a very small number of patients. People diagnosed with pancreatic disease continue to lead normal lives and remain healthy.
Measures
All study measures employed 10-point rating scales, numbered 1 to 10, labelled at either end.
Perceived personal absolute likelihood was assessed with the following single item: 'Given the information you have just received, how likely do you think you might be to develop pancreatic disease in the next 10 years?' Responses were anchored with 'not at all likely' and 'very likely'.
Perceived absolute likelihood of comparison with others was assessed with the following single item: 'Given the information you have just received, how likely do you think an average person the same age and sex as you might be to develop pancreatic disease in the next 10 years?' Responses were anchored with 'not at all likely' and 'very likely'.
Perceived severity (scale range 2-20, alpha = 0.96) was assessed by two items: 'How serious/ severe do you think pancreatic disease is?' Responses were anchored with 'not at all serious'/'very serious', 'not at all severe'/'very severe'.
Negative affect (scale range 3-30; alpha = 0.85) was assessed by three items: 'How disturbed/reassured/worried would you be by these results?' Responses were anchored with 'not at all disturbed'/'very disturbed', 'not at all reassured'/'very reassured', 'not at all worried'/ 'very worried', with responses to the 'reassured' item reverse scored.
Perceived ambiguity (scale range 5-50, alpha = 0.87) was assessed by the following five items, with anchors in parentheses: 'In general, how easy did you find answering the five questions above?' (not at all easy-very easy); 'How satisfied are you that you were given enough information to answer the five questions above?' (not at all satisfied-very satisfied); 'How clear did you find the risk information you were given?' (not at all clear-very clear); 'How confusing did you find the risk information you were given?' (not at all confusing-very confusing); 'How confident do you feel that you have understood the risk information you were given?' (not at all confident-very confident). Responses to all items except the 'confusing' item were reverse scored.
Further information question (open-ended)
The questionnaire ended with the following item: 'Is there any other information that you would like to have if you were in the situation described?' It was followed by three lines labelled 'a', 'b' and 'c', for participants to write in their responses.
Data analysis
The influence of the experimental manipulations on respondents' ratings was assessed using between-subjects ANOVA. The extent to which these effects were moderated by ratings of ambiguity was assessed using linear regression with product terms (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, pp. 311-320) . The influence of the experimental manipulations on the frequency of open-ended responses was assessed using chi-squared analysis. Mediation analyses were conducted using logistic and linear regression, in accordance with the recommendations of Kenny, Kashy and Bolger (1998) .
Results
Manipulation checks
The personal risk information manipulation affected ratings of both perceived personal likelihood (F(1,183) = 27.56, p < 0.001), and perceived severity (F(1,184) = 7.18, p = 0.008). Those respondents who were told their personal risk was 30 per cent rated their risk as more likely (M = 4.9) than those respondents who were told their personal risk was 10 per cent (M = 3.4), and rated pancreatic disease as more severe (M = 12.3) than those in the low likelihood conditions (M = 10.9).
The comparison risk information manipulation affected ratings of both the average The severity manipulation affected only ratings of severity (F(1,184) = 189.41, p < 0.001), with those respondents in the high severity conditions reporting pancreatic disease as more severe (M = 15.7) than those in the low severity conditions (M = 8.5).
There were no interactions observed between the three manipulations on ratings of personal risk, comparison risk or perceived severity of pancreatic disease. Cell means for each of these variables are shown in Table 1 .
Effects of manipulations on negative affect and perceived ambiguity
There were highly significant main effects of personal risk (F(1,185) = 31.05, p < 0.001), comparison risk (F(2,185) = 39.33, p < 0.001) and severity (F(1,185) = 20.68, p < 0.001) manipulations on negative affect ratings (see Table 1 ). Those respondents in the high severity conditions reported more negative affect (M = 18.5) than those in the low severity conditions (M = 15.3). Those respondents who were told their personal risk was 30 per cent reported more negative affect (M = 18.5) than those respondents who were told their personal risk was 10 per cent (M = 14.9). There was also an ordered relationship between level of comparison risk provided, and ratings of negative affect: respondents told the risk of their comparison group was 5 per cent reported more negative affect (M = 20.4) than those given comparison risk figures of 20 per cent (M = 16.2) or 35 per cent (M = 13.0). In addition to these main effects, there was a significant interaction between personal risk information and comparison risk information (F(2,185) = 6.36, p = 0.002). As Fig. 1 shows, the means are ordered logically from the largest favourable difference between personal and comparison with others' risk (which produced the lowest negative affect) through to the largest unfavourable difference (which produced the highest negative affect). The means for the three unfavourable comparisons conditions, however, had very similar values.
There were no significant main effects of the personal risk information, comparison risk information or severity information manipulations on ratings of ambiguity (see Table 1 ). There was, however, a significant interaction between personal risk information and comparison risk information (F(2,184) = 3.29, p = 0.039). As Fig. 2 shows, a large favourable difference between personal and comparison risk produces a relatively low degree of perceived ambiguity compared with small favourable differences or any unfavourable differences.
Moderating effects of ambiguity
Ratings of ambiguity had a significant moderating effect on the association between personal risk information and negative affect (F change (1,192) = 6.63, ⌬R 2 = 0.029, p = 0.011). The nature of this interaction is shown in Fig. 3 : the impact of the personal risk manipulation is strongest and in the expected direction at lower levels of perceived ambiguity of information. However, at high levels of perceived ambiguity, the effects are weaker. This is largely due to responses in the 30 per cent personal risk conditions being largely unaffected by ambiguity, whereas in the 10 per cent personal risk conditions, the higher the perceived ambiguity, the higher the ratings of negative affect. There was a similar significant moderating effect of ambiguity ratings on the association between comparison risk information and negative affect (F change (1,192) = 5.59, ⌬R 2 = 0.021, p = 0.019). There was no moderating effect of ambiguity on the association between severity information and negative affect (F change (1,192) 
Distributions of open-ended responses to the question about what other information respondents would like
A coding scheme was developed for the openended responses, and good agreement was achieved between the first two authors ( = 0.79). The 197 respondents requested between 0 and 4 additional pieces of information (M = 1.13, SD = 1.07), with 122 (62%) requesting at least 1 piece of information. As Table 2 shows, the most popular type of information requested concerned the control of pancreatic disease, 
Effects of manipulations on open-ended responses
There was a trend for personal risk information to have a significant impact on whether or not respondents requested at least 1 piece of information ( 2 (1) = 3.14, N = 197, p = 0.080). In the 30 per cent personal risk conditions, 63/92 respondents (68%) requested at least 1 piece of information, whereas in the 10 per cent risk conditions, 59/105 (56%) requested at least 1 piece of information. Those respondents who were allocated to lower levels of social comparison information were significantly more likely to request at least 1 piece of information ( 2 (2) = 6.52, N = 197, p = 0.038). In the 5 per cent comparison risk conditions, 51/71 (72%) requested at least 1 piece of information, compared with 37/59 (63%) and 34/67 (51%) in, respectively, the 20 per cent and 35 per cent comparison risk conditions. Figure 3 . Predicted ratings of negative affect, according to manipulated levels of personal risk information, and rated levels of perceived ambiguity. a a Legend indicates rated levels of perceived ambiguity. Levels of negative affect were estimated by a multiple linear regression model containing personal risk manipulations, levels of perceived ambiguity and an interaction term for personal risk and perceived ambiguity. These analyses were repeated according to whether the numerical risk information was favourable (i.e. risk of others higher than own risk) or unfavourable (i.e. risk of others lower than own risk). Whether the numerical risk information was favourable or not had a significant impact on whether respondents requested at least 1 category of information ( 2 (1) = 7.25, N = 197, p = 0.008). In those conditions where respondents received favourable numerical information, 54/102 (53%) requested at least 1 piece of information, whereas in the conditions where respondents received unfavourable numerical information, 68/95 (72%) requested this information There was a trend for personal risk information to have a significant impact on whether or not respondents requested at least 1 piece of information ( 2 (1) = 3.14, N = 197, p = 0.080). In the 30 per cent personal risk conditions, 63/92 respondents (68%) requested at least 1 piece of information, whereas in the 10 per cent risk conditions, 59/105 (56%) requested at least 1 piece of information.
Severity information had a significant impact on whether or not respondents requested at least 1 piece of information ( 2 (1) = 7.53, N = 197, p = 0.007). In the high severity conditions, 60/82 (73%) requested at least 1 piece of information of any sort, whereas in the low severity conditions, 62/115 (54%) requested at least 1 piece of information.
Personal risk information had a significant impact on whether or not respondents requested information on control ( 2 (1) = 4.84, N = 197, p = 0.033) and about procedures in the health services ( 2 (1) = 4.69, N = 197, p = 0.047). In the 30 per cent personal risk conditions, 53/92 respondents (58%) requested information about how to control their risk of disease, whereas in the 10 per cent risk conditions, 44/105 (42%) requested this information. In the 30 per cent personal risk conditions, 8/92 (9%) requested information about procedures in the health services, whereas in the 10 per cent risk conditions, only 2/105 (2%) requested this information.
Comparison risk information did not have a significant impact on whether or not respondents requested any particular category of information, although there was a trend for the linear-by-linear association between comparison information and requests for information about control ( 2 (1) = 3.51, N = 197, p = 0.061). In the 5 per cent comparison risk conditions, 40/71 (56%) requested information about control, compared with 30/59 (51%) and 27/67 (40%) in, respectively, the 20 per cent and 35 per cent comparison risk conditions. These analyses were repeated according to whether the numerical risk information was favourable (i.e. risk of others higher than own risk) or unfavourable (i.e. risk of others lower than own risk), but no significant effects were found on whether or not respondents requested any particular category of information.
Severity information had a significant impact on whether or not respondents requested information on control ( 2 (1) = 9.44, N = 197, p = 0.002). In the high severity conditions, 51/82 (62%) requested information about how to control their risk of disease, whereas in the low severity conditions, 46/115 (40%) requested this information.
Mediation analyses
Mediation analyses were conducted to assess whether the effects of the experimental manipulations on the open-ended response just reported were mediated by negative affect or perceived ambiguity.
The effect of the personal risk manipulation on whether or not respondents requested information on control was partially mediated by negative affect. In both cases, the four steps given by Kenny et al. (1998) were satisfied: (1) personal risk manipulation significantly predicted requests for control information; (2) personal risk manipulation significantly predicted negative affect; (3) negative affect significantly predicted requests for control information; and (4) when entered into the same regression equation, negative affect significantly predicted requests for control information, and personal risk manipulation no longer did. Only partial mediation was established however, as the Sobel test of the significance of the mediational effects indicated only a trend towards statistical significance (z = 1.76, p = 0.079).
The impact of the personal risk manipulation on whether or not respondents requested information about health services procedures was fully mediated by negative affect. In addition to satisfying the four steps of Kenny et al. (1998) , the Sobel test was statistically significant (z = 2.00, p = 0.045).
The relationship between the social comparison information and whether or not respondents requested at least one piece of information requested was fully mediated by negative affect: the same criteria were also satisfied, with a significant Sobel test (z = 2.25, p = 0.025). Similarly, the relationship between whether the numerical risk information manipulation was favourable or unfavourable and whether or not respondents requested at least one piece of information was also fully mediated by negative affect, with a significant Sobel test (z = 2.10, p = 0.035).
The impact of the severity manipulation on searching for information on whether or not respondents requested at least one piece of information was fully mediated by negative affect: when entered into the same regression equation, negative affect significantly predicted information requested, but so did the severity manipulation (Sobel test z = 2.12, p = 0.030). The impact of the severity manipulation on requests for information about how to control the disease was not mediated by negative affect: negative affect was not significantly related to requests for control information when statistical controls for the severity manipulation were included.
As there were no significant main effects of the personal risk information, comparison risk information or severity information manipulations on ratings of ambiguity, no effects of these manipulations on any category of information requested were mediated by perceived ambiguity.
Discussion
Information about personal risk, comparison risk and severity had strong main effects on ratings of negative affect, with higher threat manipulations leading to more negative affect. Ratings of ambiguity were affected by an interaction between personal and comparison risk information: the more favourable the risk information given, the more respondents rated this information as being unambiguous. Ratings of ambiguity moderated the impact of personal and comparison risk information on negative affect: although a high level of personal risk information resulted in high levels of negative affect, the extent to which a low level of perceived personal risk resulted in high levels of negative affect was largely determined by perceived ambiguity. At the lower level of personal risk information, there was a clear positive relationship between perceptions of ambiguity and similarly high levels of negative affect. Open-ended questions about what information respondents would like revealed little demand for more or clearer information about the test or test results given, but high demand for information about how to control the disease threat. There was also clear evidence that the more threatening the information given, the more respondents wanted to know about how to control the threat, or more information generally. The desire for more information, brought about by receiving information about being at higher personal risk or higher risk than the average other, was mediated by negative affect.
In addition to main effects of personal risk, comparison risk and severity manipulations on ratings of negative affect, there was an interaction between personal risk and comparison risk manipulations (see Fig. 1 ). All three unfavourable comparisons (i.e. where the personal and comparison risk levels were, respectively, 10 per cent and 5 per cent, and 30 per cent and 5 per cent and 30 per cent and 20 per cent) resulted in similar high levels of negative affect. However, for the favourable comparisons, the more favourable the comparison, the less negative affect was reported. A similar asymmetry in responses to favourable and unfavourable comparison information has been previously noted by French and colleagues (2004) , who found that responses to unfavourable comparison information were similar to responses to conditions containing no comparison information. That is, respondents who received unfavourable comparison information did not show an elevation in negative affect. However, for respondents who received favourable comparison information, the more favourable the comparison information received, the greater the reduction in negative affect. In addition to showing that this asymmetry is robust, the present study shows that negative affect is apparently unaltered by the extent to which 'bad news' is bad: slightly unfavourable comparisons elicit the same degree of negative affect as highly unfavourable comparisons. This apparent insensitivity to the degree to which comparisons are unfavourable may indicate the presence of motivated processing: respondents may be either more motivated to process messages containing these unfavourable results, leading to message derogation (e.g. Croyle, Sun, & Hart, 1997) , or else do not report the extent of the negative affect they are experiencing.
This study also included a reliable measure of ambiguity, based on ratings of the ambiguity, clarity and completeness of the information provided. This measure was not affected by the severity manipulation, but was affected by an interaction between personal and comparison risk information. As Fig. 2 shows, a large favourable difference between personal and comparison risk produces a relatively low degree of perceived ambiguity compared with small favourable differences or any unfavourable differences. As these risk information manipulations involved only the substitution of differing numbers into identical text, this result suggests that perceptions of ambiguity not only reflect felicity of expression of risk information, but also motivation. That is, when the information is not threatening, shallow processing of information may indicate that the information is unambiguous, whereas when the information is more threatening, deeper processing may highlight any omissions, ambiguities or inconsistencies (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) . This interpretation is supported by the common finding that people are more sceptical about the validity of negative self-relevant information (Croyle et al., 1997) , and unexpected positive information (Renner, 2004) than about expected positive information.
We believe that the interpretation of these two interactions was facilitated in the present study by two features of experimental design that were not present in previous studies in this area. The inclusion of a severity manipulation ruled out the possibility of confounding levels of comparison risk with levels of severity, as identified by Harris and colleagues (2002) . Further, ensuring that levels of personal and social comparison risk information were genuinely orthogonal eliminates a potential confound in previous research: that levels of comparison with others' risk was correlated with levels of personal risk. It should be noted however, that the present design introduces a different potential confound: participants who received low-risk information manipulations were also more likely to receive favourable comparisons. Further, the original Klein (1997) design has the advantage of allowing easier comparisons between different levels of favourable or unfavourable comparison risk at the same level of absolute personal risk. As both Klein's design and the design employed in the present study have strengths and weaknesses, the use of both designs should help avoid the repeated interpretation of experimental confounding as genuine psychological effects.
The present study also found evidence that ambiguity moderates the impact of personal and comparison risk information on negative affect. A simple interpretation of Fig. 3 is: (a) those people who see the risk information as ambiguous report high levels of negative affect; whereas (b) for those people who see the information as less ambiguous, the expected pattern of results is obtained: those people at lower personal risk report less negative affect than those people at higher personal risk. A similar pattern of results has been observed before (French et al., 2004) , but it is noteworthy here for several reasons. The previous study by French and colleagues used only a single-item measure assessing confidence of understanding, and found the moderating effects only for vignettes concerned with cardiac events, but not for vignettes concerned with pancreatic disease. In addition, the present study found a moderating effect of information ambiguity with a highly educated sample, where one might expect there to be less variation in understanding of information than in the general public sample where this finding was previously obtained (French et al., 2004) . These results all point towards a need for further investigations into the extent to which people understand risk communications. It has been shown that not only do many people systematically misunderstand apparently simple numerical risk communications, but also that these misunderstandings can cloud otherwise straightforward relationships between risk provided and emotional responses (Harris & Smith, 2005) .
Evidence for the importance of features of threat communications other than risk information is provided by the responses to the openended questions about what information respondents would like. As Table 2 shows, only 26 of the 197 respondents said they would like more information or clarification of the information provided about the test procedure, or the test results given. This is comparable to the 23 respondents who said they would like more information about the consequences, i.e. severity, of the information provided, and considerably less than the 97 respondents who requested information about how to control pancreatic disease. These results may at least partly be a consequence of the scenario employed: the scenario description contains much more information about the disease than the test, and the information is provided by the GP, who is likely to have high credibility for many respondents. Nevertheless, these results, combined with the weight of evidence showing that efficacy is a stronger predictor of behaviour than threat (e.g. Witte & Allen, 2000) , suggest that future researchers might consider how to communicate more effectively about ways of reducing health threats, in addition to the more extensively researched area of how best to present probabilistic risk information (e.g. Edwards, Elwyn, & Mulley, 2002) . This suggestion is reinforced by a consideration of the effects of the experimental manipulations on the open-ended responses. The higher the levels of personal risk and severity information (i.e. the more threatening the information provided), the more likely respondents were to request information about how to control the threat. There was also a trend (p = 0.061) for social comparison risk information to affect requests for information on controlling the threat: the lower the level of comparison risk, and hence the more unfavourable the comparisons, the more likely respondents were to request control information. Similarly, the higher the level of personal risk, the more likely respondents were to request information about what health service procedures would be involved. Finally, the lower the level of social comparison risk information, the more unfavourable the level of personal risk relative to comparison risk, and the higher the severity information, and hence in all cases, the higher the threat, the more likely respondents were to request information as a whole, compared with lower threat conditions. Importantly, the relationship between requesting more information, brought about by receiving information about being at higher risk or higher risk than the average other, was mediated by negative affect. In all cases, the four tests of Kenny et al. (1998) were satisfied, indicating at least partial mediation. Although the Sobel test for the relationship between personal risk information and requests for information about control was non-significant, providing evidence of only partly mediation by negative affect, low statistical power of the Sobel test should not be ruled out as a possible explanation of why full mediation was not supported (see MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) . These mediation effects extend the work of Lipkus et al. (2000) , who found that women's worries about breast cancer were predicted by both perceived personal risk and perceived comparative risk. Taken as a whole, these findings strongly suggest the operation of danger control processes (Leventhal et al., 1997) : the more threatening the information, and the more negative affect experienced, the more respondents seek information about how to control the threat, and want to know about how to cope with the threat. Given that high perceived control may lead to danger control, but low levels of perceived control lead to fear control (see Witte & Allen, 2000) , and that people clearly want information about how to control health threats, it is undoubtedly important to increase empirical understanding of the impact of different approaches to providing clear and persuasive information about control.
This finding has another important implication: we have apparently found evidence of danger control processes in an analogue study, where people are asked to imagine receiving risk information, rather than receiving real information. Further, the present study has also shown that substituting different numbers into identical risk information text yields differing ratings of ambiguity, suggesting that the possibility that when information is more threatening, deeper processing may highlight any omissions, ambiguities or inconsistencies. Taken together, these two findings suggest that analogue studies may have more validity than is often supposed (see Michie, Thompson, & Hankins, 2004) .
Conclusions and future directions
Perceived ambiguity of information was found to be influenced by favourableness of risk information, and in turn, ambiguity moderated the relationship between risk information and negative affect. It remains to be established whether ambiguity leads to negative affect, or negative affect yields higher ratings of ambiguity. Overall, these results highlight the likely importance of providing information about how to control a health threat alongside the threatening information itself. The open-ended responses suggest that respondents generally were much more interested in finding out how to control the health threat than in finding out any more about the likelihood of that threat. Further, the higher the degree of threat, the more likely respondents were to request information, especially information about control. These results demonstrate the benefits of asking people what information they would like in analogue studies, rather than just assessing their reactions to the information they are given: selection approaches should supplement the more usual reaction approaches.
Although the findings of the present study do not resolve the inconsistent pattern of findings reported in this area (French et al., 2004; Harris et al., 2002; Klein, 1997 Klein, , 2003 , we believe they highlight promising directions for doing so in the future. First, the finding that ratings of information ambiguity are influenced by the extent to which information is favourable or not, brings into question the extent to which Festinger's hypothesis may be of value in this area, or whether it requires reformulation. That is, if perceptions of the ambiguity of information are dependent on the extent to which comparison risk is higher or lower than personal risk, then it may not be sensible to hypothesize that comparison risk information will have more impact in the presence of ambiguous information. Further, the moderating role of ambiguity on both personal and comparison risk information indicates that the extent to which people understand the information they are provided with is critical in shaping their responses to it. Future work should consider separately the extent to which personal and comparison risk information are understood, rather than using a general measure of understanding of information. Finally, we believe that the open-ended responses highlight the importance of social comparison as a process, and highlight a practical method that future work might employ to shed light on this process.
